In a sense, the United States has bolted from Asia, leaving the field wide open for China to fill the geo-strategic vacuum with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Therefore, all nations, big and small, are reassessing their foreign policies by the minute (Japan being a prime example) based upon the stark reality that China is an established power that cannot be contained.

By remaining an exception that refuses to accept this truth, India is attempting the impossible. By positioning itself as China’s rival – an unfair comparison based on potential rather than present national power – India hopes to maintain an irreversible and steady rise. This is impossible.

Given the relative scope, size and strength of the project, China’s BRI could only be matched by the United States’ re-balancing (“Pivot to Asia”), which was announced in 2009 by then-President Barack Obama and subsequently abandoned by President Donald Trump. The U.S. re-balancing act had two components: military and economic. Due to constraints in resources, the economic aspect did not receive enough attention. The economics were intended to be fueled by the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

Given the United States’ unmatched military strength, the focus was unfairly shifted away from the TPP to the U.S.-backed military component to provide security (rule-based freedom of navigation across the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans) to U.S. allies and partners in the region.

The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), responsible for the Asia-Pacific, is slated to operate 60 percent of all 300 U.S. warships by 2020. U.S. PACOM commanding officer Admiral Harry Harris has expressed hope to convince India to become the netsecurity provider in the Indian Ocean Region. However, after the U.S. withdrew from the TPP, the military component of the strategy does not provide much to the region. It is not realistic to expect regional states to seek security from the U.S. military while they work for prosperity under China’s BRI.

Meanwhile, the BRI has been booming. At face value, the initiative aims to connect Asia to Africa and Europe across land (Belt) and sea (Road), through a network of roads, rails, coastal and port infrastructure and oil and gas pipelines, through policy coordination, and unimpeded trade and monetary circulation supported by the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) New Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Route Fund, and other financers. According to China, the BRI is as much about the China Dream of prosperity as it is about building an Asian community of shared interests.

The BRI, which was announced to the world in 2013 by Xi Jinping, got a shot of adrenaline from three back-to-back groundbreaking events. First, the BRI was included in a UN Security Council resolution on March 17, 2017, signaling its global acceptability. Second, one of the biggest outcomes of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2017 was the inclusion of the BRI in the Party’s constitution.

Furthermore, during Trump’s maiden visit to the Far East as president in November, China asserted on its core demand for a ‘new model of major-country relationship’ in the joint press statement issued by Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. “As I said to the President (Trump), the Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States,” Xi stated.

India, the only major nation absent at the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, opposes the BRI for a variety of reasons including concerns about sovereignty surrounding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (a flagship project of the BRI), which passes through territory claimed by India; the possibility of China shifting its stated neutral position on Jammu and Kashmir towards Pakistan; and the military threat posed by increasing Chinese presence in the region surrounding India.

There is also the unspoken strategic factor: India believes that joining the BRI would limit the available strategic options to foster its rise. Given this consideration, the best option for India would be to partner with the U.S. and other like-minded democracies to ensure that the present regional security architecture is not unsettled by the BRI.

With this objective in mind, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the country’s ‘Act East, Think West policy which emphasizes connectivity (with geopolitical implications), trade and manufacturing across two phases. After the success of SAARC, New Delhi is considering more sub-regional and extra-regional solutions under bilateral and trilateral arrangements. Examples include the Bangladesh- Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) matrix and BIMSTEC. Nations including Myanmar and some ASEAN members would be included in this phase. In phase two of Act East, which India hopes to launch in a decade, the focus will be on increased trade and manufacturing with Japan and South Korea.

Regarding the Indian Ocean Region, Delhi intends to improve connectivity and security ties through shared coastal surveillance and military exercises with the Indian Ocean Rim Association, founded in March 1997 by coastal states bordering the Indian Ocean. This was to be done through Sagarmala, the Spice Route and the Mausam initiative. Moreover, India attracted Japanese support with a pitch to develop an Asia-Africa sea corridor.

After withdrawing from the TPP, the Trump administration has sought closer ties with India. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson promised to strengthen the bilateral Major Defense Partner relationship for sales of military hardware and key technologies. The Asia-Pacific region was renamed Indo-Pacific to highlight a bigger security role for India up to the East China Sea. Furthermore, the decadeold idea of the Quadrilateral grouping or “Quad” comprised of the US, Japan, India and Australia, was revived. The first related meeting at an official level was held in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in November, however, deep uncertainty remains about its future; no nation wants to jeopardize its ties or especially economic relations with China.

With no worries about the Quad becoming a talk shop, Prime Minister Narendra Modi assured ASEAN that India “supports achieving rule-based regional security architecture” to counter China, without mention of the fact that ASEAN’s combined trade with China is expected to hit US one trillion dollars by 2020. India does not have deep pockets, an extensive navy or the engineering expertise to meet such commitments, especially with China finally moving towards a decision on a Code of Conduct (COC) with ASEAN to peacefully resolve outstanding disputes.

What are India’s best options? In addition to India’s work with like-minded democracies and friendly liberal nations as part of its Act East policy, it should study the fine print of the Chinese offer. According to Chinese ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui, the two sides could consider “early harvest on the boundary issue and alignment of the BRI with India’s own development strategies.”

Three potential effects of an agreement can be surmised. First, China might trade, for instance, India’s need for mutually agreed alignment of the Line of Actual Control, in exchange for India’s participation in the BRI. Such a move would be a big step towards resolution of the border dispute. Second, China might agree to a mutually acceptable solution to India’s sensitivity on the CPEC. Third, the consequence of such developments would itself be a positive push for peace between India and Pakistan.

If India was to align its Act East development strategies with the BRI wherever feasible and mutually beneficial – something both China and Russia want – its foreign policy options would increase exponentially. If a cue is needed, it could be taken from Japan. After winning the recent parliamentary elections, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has sought closer ties with India, both bilaterally and through the Quad. He re-negotiated the 11-member TPP after United States’ withdrawal and promised support for India’s Asia-Africa sea corridor. However, Abe was all smiles, indicating a warming of ties, when meeting Xi recently at the APEC summit in Vietnam.

India should consider cooperation rather than rivalry with China. With India becoming the bridge between the United States and China- Russia, its irreversible rise would be assured.